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Any dynamic decision model needs to deal with conditional events and conditional uncertainty
measures. Moreover, to avoid the introduction of not available information in decision processes,
we should refer to domains containing only the elements of interest. According to the aforemen-
tioned guidelines we study the comparative uncertainty framework for decision models referring
to possibility and necessity measures: we consider binary relations, deﬁned on an arbitrary set of con-
ditional events and we provide a complete characterization in terms of necessary and suﬃcient con-
ditions for their representability by a conditional possibility and by a conditional necessity.
 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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Alternative models to expected utility theory have been proposed in decision theory
under risk and uncertainty, since expected utility theory performs poorly in some situa-
tions. These more ﬂexible theories are based on non-additive measures, and among them
distorted probabilities are particularly signiﬁcant for new models (see e.g. [4,32,34]). In this
paper we focus on speciﬁc distorted probabilities, known as possibility measures and their
dual functions necessity measures [4,19,20,22]. However, to perform decision models,0888-613X/$ - see front matter  2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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ture, following the Kolmogorovian probabilistic model, a conditional measure is usually
deﬁned starting from an unconditional one. But this is a very restrictive view of condition-
ing. In fact, this conditioning is not just a trivial modiﬁcation of the ‘‘world’’. On the con-
trary in a dynamical process of acquisition of knowledge and/or decision it is essential to
regard conditioning events as ‘‘variables’’ or, in other words, as uncertain events which
can be either true or false. This point of view gives the opportunity to the decision maker
(or the ﬁeld expert) to take into account at the same time diﬀerent possible scenarios (rep-
resented by the conditioning events of interest).
To make eﬀective this idea of conditioning, starting from probability [17,28,29] many
models based on a direct deﬁnition of conditional measures have been given in literature
(see, for instance, [2,9–11,15,24]): these conditional measures are directly deﬁned on a set
(with a suitable algebraic structure) of conditional events. Moreover, in a situation of par-
tial knowledge, it is clearly very signiﬁcant (especially in any real application) to handle
partial assessments on arbitrary families of conditional events (the only ones of interest)
and possibly to enlarge those families during the process of knowledge acquisition. This
procedure, in particular, permits to avoid the introduction of not available information
performed to give complete assessments on sets with relevant Boolean structures.
However, in many situations the ﬁeld expert or the decision maker, due to his partial
knowledge, is not able, or interested, to give a numerical ‘‘even if partial’’ evaluation.
In such situations, we are content with getting (from the decision maker) an ordinal eval-
uation  (i.e. a comparative degree of belief among conditional events) comparing only
some uncertain alternatives. If we choose a decision model of reference, and so a particular
measure of uncertainty, it is necessary to be sure that the comparative relation is represent-
able by such a measure. In other words, given a numerical uncertainty framework (e.g.
probabilistic, possibilistic framework), we need to ﬁnd the necessary and suﬃcient condi-
tions for the existence of a speciﬁc function u, related to the framework of reference, rep-
resenting the comparative assessment .
Similarly to the numerical model conditional relations are usually derived from an
unconditional one, simply by assuming that an event H (strictly preferred to the impossi-
ble event) occurs [31,5,30]; moreover, many authors just consider ordinal relation H
among conditional events conditioned to the same event H. But this very restrictive model
is not able to handle real simple situations such that one: let us consider the events H = ‘‘the
daily variation of MIB TEL tomorrow will be less than 0.1%, E = ‘‘I buy the portfolio A
whose return depends on MIB TEL index’’ and G = ‘‘the Italian main electric company Enel
will buy a share of two Rumanian companies, which supply electric power’’. To handle infor-
mation we necessarily deal with the conditional events EjH, EjHc, HjG, H. A possible com-
parative relation can be EjH  EjHc, HjG  H, which compares conditional events with
diﬀerent conditioning.
Summarizing: a good comparative conditional model needs to deal with ordinal rela-
tions  deﬁned on an arbitrary set of conditional events. This topic has been studied in
[6–8] and in [14] by using as reference model conditional probability and generalized
decomposable measures.
Among the decomposable measures, possibility and necessity have an important role
also in the light of the unconditional models on acts (in the style of Savage) given in
[19,20,22], which give rises to an optimistic and a pessimistic attitude of decision maker.
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study comparative conditional models.
In [13] relations representable by a conditional possibility have been characterized; here
we deeply study this class of models and we provide necessary and suﬃcient conditions for
representability of a relation on a ﬁnite set of conditional events by a conditional necessity.
Moreover, to study comparative conditional relations representable by a conditional
necessity, we ﬁrst of all need to characterize a conditional necessity in terms of a suitable
family of unconditional necessities.
In Section 2 we present the numerical models, while in Section 3 we introduce compar-
ative degree of beliefs and we focus on ordinal relations representable by a coherent con-
ditional possibility (see Section 3.1) and by a coherent conditional necessity (see Section
3.2). Finally, in Section 4 we give some examples showing the motivations and the advan-
tages of our approach. Moreover, we analyze the diﬀerences and similarities with other
approaches presented in literature.2. Conditional possibility and necessity measures
We recall that, given a Boolean algebra B, a function
u : B! ½0; 1
is a -decomposable measure if u(X) = 1, u(;) = 0 and there exists a commutative, asso-
ciative and increasing operation  from u(B) · u(B) (u(B) denotes the range of u(Æ) on B)
to [0,1], admitting 0 as neutral element and such that the following condition holds: for
every Ei, Ej 2 B, with Ei ^ Ej = ;,
uðEi _ EjÞ ¼ uðEiÞ  uðEjÞ: ð1Þ
Two particular well-known cases of decomposable measures are probabilities (where  is
the standard sum) and possibilities (where  is the maximum). In [4], it is proved that a
possibility measure generates a distorted probability (that is the transformation by means
of an increasing function of a probability measure).
In the relevant literature, conditional possibility and necessity (the dual function of pos-
sibility) are mostly presented as a derived notion of the unconditional ones: for example,
given a possibility P(Æ) on B and a triangular norm T (i.e. a function from [0,1] · [0,1] into
[0,1] commutative, associative, non-decreasing and satisfying the boundary condition
T(1,x) = x, for all x), for every H 2 Bn{;}, a T-conditional possibility P(ÆjH) on E is
deﬁned as any solution of the equation
PðE ^ HÞ ¼ T ðx;PðHÞÞ: ð2Þ
But, for any choice of T we can have pairs (P(E ^ H),P(H)) for which the solution is not
unique. For example, when the t-norm (which stands for triangular norm) T = min, the
possible solutions of the relevant Eq. (2) (see [25]) are
PðAjBÞ ¼ PðA ^ BÞ if PðA ^ BÞ < PðBÞ;
PðA ^ BÞ 6 PðA j BÞ 6 1 if PðA ^ BÞ ¼ PðBÞ:
Note that an arbitrary solution needs not be a normalized possibility: it happens, for
example, choosing Zadeh’s conditioning rule [33] where the conditional possibility
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joint possibility.
To avoid such a problem diﬀerent conditions have been proposed: it is well known the
following one, given in [21], which consists in taking the greatest solution, i.e.
PðAjBÞ ¼ PðA ^ BÞ if PðA ^ BÞ < PðBÞ;
1 if PðA ^ BÞ ¼ PðBÞ:

ð3Þ
According to this deﬁnition, any conditional possibility is normalized, but for incompat-
ible A and B (i.e. A ^ B = ;), with P(B) = 0, one has P(AjB) equal to 1 instead of 0 as it
would be natural: in fact, any conditional measure, so also a possibility, should give 0 to
P(AjB) = P(A ^ BjB) = P(;jB). Then, we have that P(ÆjB) is not a possibility.
For that, it is not convincing to attribute, for every event A such that P(A ^ B) = P(B),
the same value inside [P(B), 1] to P(AjB). Note that the choice of value 1 for (at least) an
atom C  B is necessary to get a normalized possibility (see [1,21]) and the value 0 is
needed for any atom C with C ^ B = ;.
These problems have been faced also in [16] where the authors show that if the condi-
tional possibility is given as the greatest solution to Eq. (1) and we want P(ÆjB) to be a
possibility, then only continuous Archimedean t-norms, isomorphic to the product, can
be considered. Moreover, if the domain is ﬁnite, then T needs not be Archimedean. Nev-
ertheless the above solutions does not solve the problem related to conditioning events B
withP(B) = 0. To completely solve all the problems discussed above, a diﬀerent model has
been introduced in [2], where a direct deﬁnition of the conditional possibility is given. In
this paper we adopt this deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 1. Let E = B · H be a set of conditional events EjH such that B is a Boolean
algebra and H an additive set (i.e. closed with respect to logical sums), with H 	 B and
; 62 H. Let T be a t-norm. A function P : E! [0, 1] is a T-conditional possibility if it
satisﬁes the following properties:
1. P(EjH) = P(E ^ HjH), for every E 2 B and H 2 H;
2. P(ÆjH) is a possibility measure, for every H 2 H;
3. for every H, E ^ H 2 H and E, F 2 B
PðE ^ F j HÞ ¼ T ðPðEjHÞ;PðF jE ^ HÞÞ:
Condition 2 requires that, for every conditioning event H 2 H, the function P(ÆjH) is a
possibility, and so normalized. Condition 3 implies that the T-conditional possibility
P(ÆjH) is not singled-out by the possibility of its conditioning event H, but its value is ruled
by the values of other possibilities P(ÆjE ^ H), for suitable events E.
In the following we call P simply conditional possibility when T coincides with mini-
mum. According to Deﬁnition 1, a conditional possibility cannot always be derived by just
one ‘‘unconditional’’ possibility, except in the trivial case when P(E ^ H) < P(H) for any
H 2 H and E 2 B (with E ^ H5 H).
Now before introducing conditional necessities, we recall that the dual function
N : B! [0, 1] of a possibility P is deﬁned by means of N(E) = 1  P(Ec) for every
E 2 B, so the function N, called necessity, satisﬁes the following properties: N(X) = 1,
N(;) = 0 and for every Ei,Ej 2 B
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Thus, conditional necessities have been introduced in [3] by taking, for any EjH 2 B · H
NðEjHÞ ¼ 1PðEcjHÞ:
This gives rise to the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 2. Let E = B · H be a set of conditional events EjH such that B is a Boolean
algebra and H an additive set with H 	 B and ; 62 H. A function N : E! [0, 1] is a
conditional necessity if it satisﬁes the following properties:
1. N(EjH) = N(E ^ HjH) for every E 2 B and H 2 H;
2. N(ÆjH) is a necessity measure for every H 2 H;
3. for every H, Ec ^ H 2 H and E,F 2 B
NðF _ EjHÞ ¼ maxðNðEjHÞ;NðF jEc ^ HÞÞ:
A trivial generalization can be obtained by using the same procedure for a S-conditional
necessity (where S is a t-conorm, i.e. S : [0, 1]2! [0, 1] is commutative, associative, mono-
tone and S(x, 0) = x). We recall (see e.g. [26]) that a t-conorm S can be obtained starting
from a t-norm T and a strict negation g, i.e. S(x,y) = g1(T(g(x),g(y))); so S is g-dual to T.
We note that the set of axioms (of Deﬁnitions 1 and 2) works if the set E is well struc-
tured from a logical point of view, but the axioms become not enough strong when the set
of conditional events is arbitrary (more precisely when the function is not deﬁned on the
whole product of a Boolean algebra and an additive set). To handle general situations we
introduce the concept of coherence.
Deﬁnition 3. Given an arbitrary set of conditional events F, a real function f on F is a
coherent T-conditional possibility (S-conditional necessity) assessment if, there exists
E 
 F with E = B · B0 (B is an algebra and B0 = Bn{;}) such that there exists a
conditional possibility (necessity) on E extending f.
Obviously, in the unconditional case a function from F = {E1, . . . ,En} to [0,1] is a
coherent necessity (possibility) assessment if it can be extended on the algebra B, spanned
by F, as a necessity (possibility) measure.
2.1. Characterization of conditional possibilities
Characterizations of coherent T-conditional possibilities on ﬁnite set of conditional
events have been given in [12,15,23,24]. We recall here that introduced in [12,15] related
to the case T = min.
Deﬁnition 4. Let B be a ﬁnite algebra and C0 be the set of atoms of B. The class
P = {P0, . . . ,Pk} of possibilities deﬁned on B is said nested if the following conditions
hold:
1. Pj (C) = Pj1(C) if C 2 CjnHj (j > 0);
2. Pj1(C) 6 Pj (C) if C 2 Hj (j > 0);
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4. for any C 2 C0 there exists a (unique) j = 0, . . . ,k such that Pj(C) = 1; where, for
j = 1, . . . ,k, Cj = {C 2 Cj1 : Pj1(C) < 1} and
Hj ¼ fCi 2 Cj : 9=C 2 Cj s:t: Pj1ðCÞ > Pj1ðCiÞg:
Obviously, Hj  Cj and Cj 	 Cj1, moreover Hj (with j > 0) includes those atoms with the
‘‘highest’’ possibility under Pj1, which potentially can have possibility equal to 1 under
Pj.
Note that since Pj’s (j = 0, . . . ,k) are possibilities, so there is at least an atom such that
Pj(C) = 1, then k must be less than the number of atoms in B.
Theorem 5. Let F = {E1jH1, . . . ,EnjHn} be a finite set of conditional events, C0 and B denote
the set of atoms and the algebra generated by {E1,H1, . . . ,En,Hn}, respectively.
For a real function P : F! [0,1], the following statements are equivalent:
(a) P is a coherent conditional possibility on F;
(b) there exists (at least) a nested classP = {P0, . . . ,Pk} of possibilities on B, such that for
any EijHi 2 F there exists a unique Pa with Pa(Hi) = 1 and P(EijHi) is the unique solu-
tion of the equation
PaðEi ^ HiÞ ¼ minfx;PaðHiÞg; ð4Þ
and it is a solution of any equation (with b 6 a)
PbðEi ^ HiÞ ¼ minfx;PbðHiÞg; ð5Þ
(c) there exists a sequence of compatible systems
Sa ¼
max
CrEi^Hi
xar ¼ min PðEijHiÞ;maxCrHi x
a
r
 
if max
CrHi
xa1r < 1
xar P x
a1
r if Cr 2 Ha
xar ¼ xa1r if Cr 2 Ca nHa
max
Cr2C0
xr ¼ 1
xar P 0 8Cr 2 C0
8>>>>><>>>>>:
with a = 0, . . . , k, where xa (with rth component xar ) is the solution of the system Sa, moreover
x1r ¼ 0 for any Cr in C0, and Ca ¼ fCr : xar < 1g, Ha ¼ Cr : Cr 2 Ca; xa1r ¼

maxCj2Cax
a1
j g.Remark 6. Any given conditional possibility on B · B0 generates a unique class {Pa}
agreeing with P; vice versa a nested class gives rise to a unique conditional possibility
on B · B0. Then, any conditional possibility can be ‘‘represented’’ by means of a suitable
class of possibilities, instead of just one possibility measure [12,15]. Moreover, for a coher-
ent conditional possibility P there are many agreeing classes agreeing with P.
Thus, the test of coherence for a conditional possibilistic assessment is reduced to check
the compatibility of a sequence of systems and any solution gives rise to a nested class
{Pa} of possibilities on B agreeing with a coherent conditional possibility.
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In this section we give a characterization for conditional necessities similar to that given
for conditional possibility in [12,15] and summarized in Section 2.1.
Deﬁnition 7. Let B0 be a ﬁnite algebra. The class N = {N0, . . . ,Nk} of necessities deﬁned
on B0 is said nested if, the following conditions hold:
(1) Nj(B) = Nj1(B) if B 2 BjnHj (j > 0),
(2) Nj(B) 6 Nj1(B) if B 2 Hj (j > 0),
(3) Nj(B) = 0 for all the events B 2 B0nBj,
(4) for any B 2 B00 there exists j = 0, . . . ,k such that Nj(Bc) = 0,
where, for any j = 1, . . . ,k, Bj = {B 2 Bj1 : Nj1(B) > 0} and
Hj ¼ fB 2 Bj : 9=C 2 Bj s:t: Nj1ðBÞ > Nj1ðCÞg:
Notice that Hj (with j > 0) is actually the set of the elements of Bj with the ‘‘lowest’’ po-
sitive necessity under Nj1 and can potentially have necessity Nj equal to 0 (see condition
2 of Deﬁnition 7). Conditions (3) and (4) imply that, for any event H5 X there exists an
index j* such that Nj ðHÞ ¼ 0 and, for any j < j*, Nj(H) > 0.Deﬁnition 8. A class N = {N0, . . . ,Nk} of necessities on B0 is agreeing with a conditional
necessity N(ÆjÆ) on B0 · H if it is nested and, for any EjH 2 B0 · H, N(EjH) is a solution of
all the equations
N aðE _ HcÞ ¼ maxfx;N aðHcÞg ð6Þ
with a = 0, . . . , j* and j* = min{j : Nj(H
c) = 0}, moreover, N(EjH) is the unique solution of
the above equation for a = j*.Remark 9. In the case of conditional possibilities an agreeing class is built essentially
working on atoms (since the possibility of an event is computed by the possibility of the
atoms), while in the case of conditional necessities an agreeing class should be built directly
on events, in fact the necessity of an atom C is deduced by the necessity of the events con-
taining the atom C.
From Theorem 5 and the results presented in Appendix the following characterization
theorem for coherent conditional necessities arises:
Theorem 10. Let F = {E1jH1, . . . ,EnjHn} be a finite set of conditional events, C0 and B
denote the set of atoms and the algebra generated by {E1,H1, . . . ,En,Hn}, respectively. For a
real function N : F! [0,1], the following statements are equivalent:
(a) N is a coherent conditional necessity on F;
(b) there exists (at least) a nested class N = {N0, . . . ,Nk} of necessities on B, such that
N(EijHi) is solution of all the equations
N aðEi _ Hci Þ ¼ max x;N a Hci
   ð7Þ
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  ¼ 0  and it is the unique solution of the
above equation for a = j*;
(c) there exists a sequence of compatible systems
Sa ¼
1 max
CrEci ^Hi
xar ¼ max NðEijHiÞ; 1 maxCrHi x
a
r
 
if max
CrHi
xa1r < 1
xar P x
a1
r if Cr 2 Ha
xar ¼ xa1r if Cr 2 Ca nHa
max
Cr2C0
xr ¼ 1
xar P 0 8Cr 2 C0
8>>>>><>>>>>:
with a = 0, . . . , k, where xa (with rth component xar ) is the solution of the system Sa, moreover
x1r ¼ 0 for any Cr in C0 and Ca ¼ Cr : xar < 1
 
, Ha ¼ Cr : Cr 2 Ca; xa1r ¼

maxCj2Cax
a1
j g.Then, the above theorem shows that, analogously to the case of possibilities, coherence
for conditional necessity assessments can be proved by checking a sequence of systems.
The proof of Theorem 10 is given in Appendix together with many minor results necessary
to reach this goal.
3. Qualitative model
Let  be a binary relation on an arbitrary set of events E = {Ei,Fi}i2I expressing the
intuitive idea of being ‘‘no more believable than’’. The symbols  and  indicate the sym-
metric and asymmetric parts of , respectively: E  F means roughly speaking that E is
judged ‘‘equally believable’’ to F, while E  F means that F is ‘‘more believed’’ than E.
The relation  expresses a qualitative judgement and it is necessary to set up a system of
rules guaranteeing the consistency of the relation with some numerical model. More pre-
cisely, given a numerical framework of reference (singled-out by means of a numerical
measure of uncertainty), we need to ﬁnd the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the
existence of a numerical assessment representing .
We recall that a function f from E to Rþ represents the relation  iﬀ
E  F ) f ðEÞ 6 f ðF Þ;
E  F ) f ðEÞ < f ðF Þ:
If we focus on the relations representable by a capacity (i.e. a function monotone with re-
spect to inclusion ), it is necessary that there exists an extension of  on the algebra B
spanned by E satisfying the following conditions:
(c1)  is a total preorder (i.e. reﬂexive, transitive and deﬁned for all pairs E,F 2 B);
(c2) ;  E for every E 2 B, and ;  X;
(c3) for every E,F 2 B, E  F ) E  F .
When we specify the capacity (probability, belief, lower or upper probability, possibility
and so on), then we need to require further characteristic conditions to , see for instance
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E,F,H 2 B, with E ^ H = F ^ H = ;, the following condition
E  F ) E _ H  F _ H : ð8Þ
If moreover  is strictly increasing, then  satisﬁes also
E  F ) E _ H  F _ H : ð9Þ
On the other hand, (8) together with (c1), (c2), (c3) is not suﬃcient to guarantee the exis-
tence of a -decomposable measure. In fact, we recall the well-known example of Kraft
et al. [27]: a relation over the algebra generated by the partition {A,B,C,D,E}
;  A  B  C  A _ B  A _ C  D  A _ D  B _ C  E  A _ B _ C  B _ D
 C _ D  A _ E  A _ B _ D  B _ E  A _ C _ D     :
which is not representable by a decomposable measure, even though it satisﬁes (8), (9),
(c1), (c2), (c3), see [9,14].
In particular, as proved in [18] any relation representable by a possibility measure sat-
isﬁes (c1), (c2), (c3) and, for any A,B,C 2 B
ðPOÞ A  B) ðA _ CÞ  ðB _ CÞ:
In the same paper it is shown that the relations representable with a necessity measure
must satisfy (c1), (c2), (c3) and, for every A,B,C 2 B
ðNECÞ A  B) ðA ^ CÞ  ðB ^ CÞ:
The main aim of this paper is to study binary relations deﬁned on a ﬁnite set of conditional
events, and to detect necessary and suﬃcient conditions for representing a relation  by a
coherent conditional possibility and by a coherent conditional necessity.
We introduce for a relation  deﬁned on B · H the following basic axioms (which are
necessary and suﬃcient for the representation of  by a generalized decomposable condi-
tional measure [14]):
(A0) the relation  is a total preorder;
(A1) for all H 2 H it holds ;jH  HjH;
(A2) for all H,K 2 H it holds ;jH  ;jK and HjH  KjK;
(M) for all A,B 2 B and H 2 H, if (A ^ H)  (B ^ H), then AjH  BjH holds.
Conditions (A0), (A1) and (M) just refer to a given conditioning event H. A relation
H (with H 2 H) deﬁned (as the restriction of ) through
AHB() AjH  BjH for every A; B 2 B;
which satisﬁes the above three conditions is representable by a capacity.
The condition (A2) is a ﬁrst constraint among the diﬀerent conditioning events.
Now, we introduce the following axioms
(A3) for all Ai,Bi 2 B and Bi ^ Hi,Hi 2 H, (i = 1,2)
A1jB1 ^ H1  A2jB2 ^ H2 and B1jH 1  B2jH 2 ) A1 ^ B1jH 1  A2 ^ B2jH 2,
A1jB1 ^ H1  B2jH2 and B1jH 1  A2jB2 ^ H 2 ) A1 ^ B1jH 1  A2 ^ B2jH 2.
(A3 0) for all Ai,Bi 2 B and Bi ^ Hi,Hi 2 H, (i = 1,2)
A1jB1 ^ H1  A2jB2 ^ H2 and Bc1jH 1  Bc2jH 2 ) A1 _ Bc1jH 1  A2 _ Bc2jH 2,
A1jB1 ^ H 1  Bc2jH 2 and Bc1jH 1  A2jB2 ^ H 2 ) A1 _ Bc1jH 1  A2 _ Bc2jH 2.
350 G. Coletti, B. Vantaggi / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 45 (2007) 341–363The above axioms link the relations related to conditional events with diﬀerent condi-
tioning; they have the same role as axiom 3 of Deﬁnitions 1 and 2, respectively, in the
numerical framework.
Note that axiom (A3) implies that for every A 2 B and B,H 2 H
ðA ^ BÞjH  AjðB ^ HÞ: ð10Þ
In fact, taking A1 = A = A2, H1 = H, B1 = B and H2 = B ^ H = B2 and substituting in
condition (A3), one gets (10).
Moreover, applying also (A2) and transitivity one has that
BjH  H jH ) AjðB ^ HÞ  ðA ^ BÞjH : ð11Þ
Analogously, Aj(B ^ H)  (B ^ H)j(B ^ H) implies (A ^ B)jH  BjH.
Axiom (A3 0) implies that for every A,B 2 B and Bc ^ H,H 2 H
AjðBc ^ HÞ  A _ BjH : ð12Þ
Take A1 = A = A2, H1 = B
c ^ H, B1 = Bc = B2, H2 = H in condition (A3 0).
Moreover, by (A2) and transitivity we have
BjH  ;jH ) AjðBc ^ HÞ  ðA _ BÞjH ;
AjðBc ^ HÞ  ;jðB ^ HÞ ) ðA _ BÞjH  BjH .3.1. Comparative conditional possibility
We introduce the following condition (CPO), which is a reinforcement of (M) (CPO)
for every A,B,C 2 B and H 2 H
AjH  BjH ) ðA _ CÞjH  ðB _ CÞjH :
This condition is essentially that proposed by Dubois in [18], just reread on the hypothesis
H, so for every givenH 2 H the relation H (the restriction of  to events EjH with E 2 B)
is representable by a possibility P(ÆjH).
On the other hand (as proved in [18] for the unconditional case) condition (CPO) is
equivalent to the following one:
AjH  BjH ) ðA _ BÞjH  BjH for every A;B 2 B; and H 2 H: ð13Þ
Note that (CPO) is also equivalent (see [13]), under transitivity, to
AjH  BjK and CjH  DjK ) ðA _ CÞjH  ðB _ DÞjK:
To prove that suppose, without loss of generality, AjH  CjH, then by condition (13) and
transitivity (A _ C)jH  CjH  DjK  (B _ D)jK follows.
About axiom (CPO) we recall, for completeness, some other results, which essentially
go in the same lines of those given in [18] for the unconditional case.
Proposition 11. Let  be a binary relation on a finite set E = B · H of conditional events. If
 is a total preorder satisfying (A1) and (CPO), then it satisfies the following further
conditions:
(1) if AjH  BjH  CjH, then A _ CjH  B _ CjH,
(2) if AjH  BjH and CjH  BjH, then A _ CjH  BjH  B _ CjH  A _ B _ CjH.
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B _ CjH, so condition 1 follows. Let AjH  BjH and CjH  BjH, if CjH  AjH, then it
follows A _ CjH  AjH  BjH; while if AjH  CjH, then A _ CjH  CjH  BjH, hence
condition 2 holds. hCorollary 12. Let  be a binary relation on a finite set E = B · H of conditional events, and
let C be the set of atoms contained in the algebra B. If  is a total preorder satisfying (A1)
and (CPO), then for every H 2 H there exists at least an atom C 2 C, with C  H, such that
CjH  HjH.Proof. If we suppose that there is H 2 H such that for any atom C  H one has
CjH  HjH, then by condition 2 of Proposition 11 we would obtain ¤CHCjH  HjH,
which is absurd, since

¤CHC
jH = HjH. h
Proposition 13. Let P be a coherent T-conditional possibility on an arbitrary finite set F of
conditional events. If  is the binary relation on F induced by P, then  admits an extension
on B · H 
 F (where B is a Boolean algebra and H is an additive set) satisfying (A0), (A1),
(A2), (A3) and (CPO).Proof. Let us denote by P* any T-conditional possibility on B · H extending P. Since for
every H 2 H the function P*(ÆjH) is a possibility measure, then the binary relation H
induced by P*(ÆjH) satisﬁes (CPO) and (A1). Since P*(;jH) = 0 = P*(;jK), for every
H,K 2 H, then (A2) holds.
Moreover, condition (A0) is fulﬁlled by any relation , induced by a real function,
while (A3) follows directly from condition 3 of Deﬁnition 1. h
The above result shows that axioms (A0)–(A3) and (CPO) are necessary for
representing a relation  by a T-conditional possibility, for any t-norm T. Obviously,
the choice of the particular t-norm might require an additional axiom; in the case of
conditional possibilities (i.e. when the t-norm is the minimum), the relation must satisfy
the following condition:
for any A,B 2 B,H 2 H,
A ^ BjH  BjH ) A ^ BjH  AjB ^ H : ð14Þ
The next result shows that condition (14) links the diﬀerent relations H, for suitable con-
ditioning events H.Proposition 14. Let  be a relation on B · H satisfying condition (14), then for every A  C
and B 
 C the following statements hold:
– if AjH  BjH  CjH) AjC ^ H  BjC ^ H  CjH
– if AjH  BjH  CjH) AjC ^ H  BjC ^ H  CjH.Proof. If AjH  BjH  CjH, then (by condition (14)), since A  C and B  C, one has
AjC ^ H  AjH  BjH  BjC ^ H  CjH.
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AjH  BjH  BjC ^ H and so the thesis follows. h
Finally, we are able to give the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 15. Let E = B · H be a ﬁnite set of conditional events with B a boolean algebra
andH 	 B an additive set not containing ;. A binary relation  on E is called comparative
conditional possibility iﬀ the following conditions hold:
(1)  is a total preorder;
(2) for any H,K 2 H, ;jH  ;jK  HjH  KjK;
(3) for any A,B 2 B and H,B ^ H 2 H,
A ^ BjH  AjB ^ H
and moreover if either A ^ BjH  BjH or BjH  HjH, then A ^ BjH  AjB ^ H;(4)  satisﬁes (CPO).
Condition (3) requires that, when new information ‘‘B’’ is assumed, the degree of belief
of an event A (or better of A ^ B) does non-decreases. Moreover, if the new information is
‘‘almost sure’’, it means B  X, then the degree of belief of an event A remains equal to its
updated degree of belief.
Note that the condition (A ^ BjH  BjH)) (A ^ BjH  AjB ^ H) appears more tech-
nical and less intuitive than the above situation.
We note that condition 3 of Deﬁnition 15 is a reinforcement of (A3):
Proposition 16. Let  be a relation on E = B · H satisfying (CPO) and such that
A ^ BjH  AjB ^ H, for any A,B 2 B and H,B ^ H 2 H. If moreover either A ^ BjH 
BjH or BjH  HjH imply A ^ BjH  AjB ^ H, then  satisfies (A3).Proof. Let A1jB1 ^ C1,B1jC1,A2jB2 ^ C2,B2jC2 2 B · H and suppose that A1jB1 ^ C1 
A2jB2 ^ C2 and B1jC1  B2jC2.
If A1 ^ B1jC1  A1jB1 ^ C1, then both the relations A1 ^ B1jC1  B1jC1 and B1jC1 
C1jC1 cannot hold by hypotheses, so A1 ^ B1jC1  B1jC1 and B1jC1  C1jC1.
Then, one has the following situations:
– if A1 ^ B1jC1  A1jB1 ^ C1 and A2 ^ B2jC2  A2jB2 ^ C2, then
A1 ^ B1jC1  B1jC1  B2jC2  A2 ^ B2jC2;
– if A1 ^ B1jC1  A1jB1 ^ C1 and A2 ^ B2jC2  A2jB2 ^ C2, then
B1jC1  A1 ^ B1jC1  A1jB1 ^ C1  A2jB2 ^ C2  A2 ^ B2jC2;
– if A1 ^ B1jC1  A1jB1 ^ C1 and A2 ^ B2jC2  A2jB2 ^ C2, then
A1 ^ B1jC1  B1jC1  B2jC2  A2 ^ B2jC2;
– if A1 ^ B1jC1  A1jB1 ^ C1 and A2 ^ B2jC2  A2jB2 ^ C2, then
A1 ^ B1jC1  A1jB1 ^ C1  A2jB2 ^ C2  A2 ^ B2jC2:
The proof of the second implication of (A3) is similar. h
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a coherent comparative conditional possibility if and only if there exists a comparative
conditional possibility on B · H  E (where B is an algebra and H 	 B an additive set),
which extends .
The following theorem characterizes coherent comparative conditional possibilities in
terms of representability by a numerical conditional possibility.
Theorem 18. Let F be a finite set of conditional events. For a binary relation  on F, the
following statements are equivalent:
(i)  is a coherent comparative conditional possibility;
(ii) there exists a coherent conditional possibility P on F representing .Proof. We prove that (ii) implies (i). Denote by the same symbol P any conditional pos-
sibility extending P on B · H  F, and let  be the binary relation induced by P. Then,
the conditions 1 and 2 of Deﬁnition 15 are trivially satisﬁed.
Since P(A ^ BjH) = min{P(AjB ^ H),P(BjH)} 6 P(AjB ^ H), one has that if P(A ^
BjH) < P(BjH) (i.e. A ^ BjH  BjH), then P(A ^ BjH) = P(AjB ^ H) (i.e. A ^ BjH 
AjB ^ H); on the other hand if P(BjH) = 1 (i.e. BjH  HjH), then again P(A ^ BjH) =
P(AjB ^ H), hence condition 3 is satisﬁed.
Moreover, since for any H 2 H the function P(ÆjH) on B is a possibility, i.e.
PðAjHÞ 6 PðBjHÞ ) PðA _ CjHÞ 6 PðB _ CjHÞ
for any C 2 B, then  satisﬁes (CPO), so  is a coherent comparative conditional possi-
bility on F.
We prove now that (i) implies (ii). Denote by the same symbol  a comparative
conditional possibility extending  on E = B · H 
 F.
Let E0, . . . ,El be a class of subsets of E such that for all EijHi 2 Es and EjjHj 2 Ek we
have EijHi  EjjHj, if s < k. By condition 2 of Deﬁnition 15 it follows that lP 1. In
particular, EijHi  ;jHi if EijHi 2 E0, and EjjHj  HijHi if EjjHj 2 El.
Now, consider a function f : E! [0, 1] deﬁned by putting
f ðEjHÞ ¼ r
l
if EjH 2 Er ðwith r ¼ 0; . . . ; lÞ;
which obviously represents . We need to prove that f(ÆjÆ) is a conditional possibility on E.
First of all, we note that for every H 2 H, by condition 2 of Deﬁnition 15 we have
;jH 2 E0, HjH 2 El and by construction f(;jH) = 0 and f(HjH) = 1.
Since H is an additive class, the event H0 =¤H2HH belongs to H. Let us deﬁne, for
every E 2 B, P0(E) = f(EjH0). By (CPO) EjH0  FjH0 implies FjH0  (E _ F)jH0, then for
every E,F 2 B
P0ðE _ F Þ ¼ maxfP0ðEÞ;P0ðF Þg;
moreover we have P0(K) = 0 for any K ^ H0 = ;, because (H0)cjH0  ;jH0. Then, P0(Æ) is
a possibility on B and represents H0 , that is the restriction of  on {EjH0 : E 2 B}.
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a (unique) conditional possibility P on B · H0. In fact, since for every H 2 H0 we have
P0(H) = 1, then, by condition 3 of Deﬁnition 1, it follows P(A ^ HjH0) = P0(A ^ H) =
P(AjH) for every A 2 B.
Moreover, since for every H 2 H0 condition 3 of Deﬁnition 15 implies HjH0  H0jH0,
and so AjH  A ^ HjH0, then conditional possibilityP, coincides with f on B · H0, and so
(obviously) represents  restricted to B · H0.
If H0 ˆ H, let C1 = {C 2 H : CjH0  H0jH0} and H1 ¼ WC2C1C. We note that, by
deﬁnition of C1, H1jH0  H0jH0 (i.e. P0(H1) < 1) and take H1 = {C 2 C1 : 9=D 2 C1 s.t.
CjH0  DjH0}. It follows that there is an atom C  H1 such that CjH1  H1jH1 from
Corollary 12, and from the deﬁnition of H1 one has that C 2 H1.
For any C 2 (C1nH1) it follows (being C  H1 	 H0) by construction C ^ H1jH0 
H1jH0, then condition (3) of Deﬁnition 15 implies C ^ H1jH0  CjH1 ^ H0 (i.e. CjH0 
CjH1). Moreover f(CjH1) is the unique solution of the equation P0(C) = min{x,P0(H1)}.
On the other hand, for any C 2 H1 equation P0(C) = min{x,P(H1)} has no unique
solution xP P(H1). Hence, deﬁne
P1ðAÞ ¼
P0ðAÞ if AjH 0  H 1jH 0
r
l if AjH 0  H 1jH 0 and AjH 1 2 Er
(
The function P1 on B is a possibility, moreover f(AjH) = P1(A ^ H) for any H such that
HjH1  H1jH1.
In the same way we build C2, H2 and P2 and so on till C
k contains no event.
The class of possibilities {P1, . . . ,Pk} is a nested class and it is representable by the
function f, so f is a conditional possibility. h3.2. Comparative conditional necessity
Let us introduce condition
(CNEC) for all A,B,C 2 B and H 2 H
AjH  BjH ) ðA ^ CÞjH  ðB ^ CÞjH ;
which implies monotonicity (M). Since this condition is that proposed in [22] reread on the
hypothesisH, then, for every givenH 2 H the relation H on B is representable by a neces-
sity N(ÆjH).
Proposition 19. Let  be a relation on B · H satisfying transitivity. Then, (CNEC) is
equivalent to the following condition
AjH  BjK and CjH  DjK ) A ^ CjH  B ^ DjK: ð15ÞProof. By taking H = K in condition (15) (CNEC) follows.
On the other hand, if AjH  CjH, then (CNEC) implies A ^ CjH  AjH. Moreover, if
BjK  DjK, then B ^ DjK  BjK and it follows that A ^ CjH  AjH  BjK  B ^ DjK.
While if DjK  BjK, then B ^ DjK  DjK and A ^ CjH  CjH  DjK  B ^ DjK. h
Even if the condition AjH  BjK and CjH  DjK) A ^ CjH  B ^ DjK seems stron-
ger than (CNEC), Proposition 19 shows that they are equivalent.
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alent under (A0), (A1), (A2), for every conditioning event H, to the following conditions:
(a1) (A ^ H)  (B ^ H)) AjH  BjH;
(a2) A ^ BjH  AjH or A ^ BjH  BjH.Proposition 20. Let N be a coherent conditional necessity on a finite set of conditional events
F. If  is a binary relation on F induced by N, then  admits an extension on B · H 
 F
(where B is a Boolean algebra and H is an additive set) satisfying (A0), (A1), (A2), (A3 0) and
(CNEC).Proof. Let us denote by N* any conditional necessity on B · H extending N. Since for
every H 2 H the function N*(ÆjH) is a necessity measure, then the binary relation H
induced by N*(ÆjH) satisﬁes (CNEC) and (A1). Being N*(;jH) = 0 = N*(;jK), for any
H,K 2 H, (A2) holds.
Moreover, condition (A0) is satisﬁed since  is induced by a real function, while (A3 0)
follows directly from condition 3 of Deﬁnition 2. h
However, the above conditions are necessary, but not suﬃcient, for representing a rela-
tion on a set of conditional events by means of a coherent conditional necessity. Thus, we
consider the following condition:
AjBc ^ H  A _ BjH
and either BjH  A _ BjH or BjH  ;jH imply A _ BjH  AjBc ^ H.
It is easy to check that any conditional necessity induces a relation satisfying the above
condition: in fact, it follows directly by condition 3 of Deﬁnition 2 and it is actually a rein-
forcement of (A3 0).
We are able now to give the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 21. Let E = B · H be a ﬁnite set of conditional events with B a Boolean algebra
and H 	 B an additive set not containing ;. A binary relation  on E is a comparative
conditional necessity if and only if the following conditions hold:
(1)  is a total preorder;
(2) for every A 2 B and H,K 2 H, ;jH  ;jK  HjH  KjK;
(3) for every A,B 2 B and H,Bc ^ H 2 H,
AjBc ^ H  A _ BjH
and moreover if BjH  A _ BjH or BjH  ;jH, then
A _ BjH  AjBc ^ H
(4)  satisﬁes (CNEC).Proposition 22. Let  be a relation on B · H satisfying condition (3), then for every A  B
and A  C such that Ac ^ H, H 2 H the following statements hold:
– if AjH  BjH  CjH) ;jAc ^ H  BjAc ^ H  CjH
– if AjH  BjH  CjH) ;jAc ^ H  BjAc ^ H  CjH.
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ogously A _ CjH  CjAc ^ H, so
BjAc ^ H  A _ BjH  BjH  CjH  A _ CjH  CjAc ^ H ;
moreover AjAc ^ H  ;jH  BjH  BjAc ^ H.
While if AjH  BjH  CjH one has from condition 3 that
BjAc ^ H  A _ BjH  BjH  CjH  A _ CjH  CjAc ^ H ;
and again since ;jH  BjH the thesis follows. h3.2.1. Comparative coherent conditional necessity
Deﬁnition 23. Let  be a binary relation on a ﬁnite set F of conditional events. Then,  is
a coherent comparative conditional necessity if and only if there exists a comparative
conditional necessity on B · H  F (where B is a Boolean algebra andH 	 B is an additive
class), which extends .
The following result characterizes coherent comparative conditional necessities in terms
of representability by a numerical conditional necessity.
Theorem 24. Let F be a finite set of conditional events. For a binary relation  on F, the
following statements are equivalent:
(i)  is a coherent comparative conditional necessity;
(ii) there exists a coherent conditional necessity N on F representing .Proof. Denote by the same symbol N any conditional necessity extending N on B · H  F,
and let  be the binary relation induced by N. Then, the conditions 1 and 2 of Deﬁnition
21 are trivially satisﬁed (see Proposition 20).
Since N(A _ BjH) = max{N(AjBc ^ H),N(BjH)}P N(AjBc ^ H), one has the following
two situations:
– if N(A _ BjH) > N(BjH), then N(A _ BjH) = N(AjBc ^ H) (it means that BjH 
A _ BjH implies A _ BjH  AjBc ^ H);
– if N(BjH) = 0 (i.e. BjH  ;jH), then again N(A _ BjH) = N(AjBc ^ H) (i.e. A _ BjH 
AjBc ^ H), hence condition 3 is satisﬁed.
Moreover, since for every H 2 H the function N(ÆjH) on B is a necessity, i.e.
NðAjHÞ 6 NðBjHÞ ) NðA ^ CjHÞ 6 NðB ^ CjHÞ
for any C 2 B, then  satisﬁes (CNEC), so  restricted to F is a coherent comparative con-
ditional necessity.
We prove now that (i) implies (ii). Denote by the same symbol  a comparative
conditional necessity extending  on E = B · H 
 F.
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have EijHi  EjjHj, if s < k. By condition 2 of Deﬁnition 21 it follows that lP 1. In
particular, EijHi  ;jHi if EijHi 2 E0, and EjjHj  HijHi if EjjHj 2 El.
Now, consider a function f : E! [0, 1] deﬁned by putting
f ðEjHÞ ¼ r
l
if EjH 2 Er ðwith r ¼ 0; . . . ; lÞ
which obviously represents . We need to prove that f(ÆjÆ) is a conditional necessity on E.
First of all, we note that for every H 2 H, by condition 2 of Deﬁnition 21 ;jH 2 E0 and
HjH 2 El, and by construction f(;jH) = 0 and f(HjH) = 1. Moreover, (CNEC) implies
;jH  EjH  HjH (and f(EjH) 2 [0,1]).
The event H0 = _H2HH belongs to H, so we deﬁne, for every E 2 B, N0(E) = f(EjH0).
By (CNEC) we have that if EjH0  FjH0, then EjH0  (E ^ F)jH0 (i.e.
N0(E ^ F) = min{N0(E),N0(F)}), for any E,F 2 B and N0(K) = 0 for K such that
K ^ H0 = ; (being (H0)cjH0  ;jH0). Thus, N0(Æ) on B is a necessity and represents the
ordering on {EjH0 : E 2 B}.
Let H0 = {H 2 H : N0(Hc) = 0}, which is an additive class since H,K 2 H0 implies that
N0(H
c ^ Kc) 6 N0(Hc) = 0.
The necessity N0 on B gives rise to a (unique) conditional necessity N(ÆjÆ) on B · H0. In
fact, since for every H 2 H0 one has N0(Hc) = 0, N(A _ HcjH0) = N0(AjH) (by condition 3
of Deﬁnition 2). Moreover, since, for any event H 2 H0, condition 3 of Deﬁnition 21
implies HcjH0  ;jH0, and so AjH  A _ HcjH0, then N coincides with f on B · H0 and
represents  restricted to B · H0.
If H0 ˆ H, let B1 = {H 2 H : ;jH0  HcjH0} and deﬁne K1 ¼
W
H2B1H , which belongs
to H. Then Kc1 ¼
V
H2B1H
c  Hc for any H 2 B1, so we get Kc1 j H0  HcjH 0 for any
H 2 B1.
Denote by H1 = {B 2 B1 : 9=C 2 B1 s.t. N0(Bc) > N0(Cc)}. Then, Kc1 2 H1 from
(CNEC), see also the equivalence of that condition with (a2) under the above hypotheses.
If H is such that Hc 2 (B1nH1), then Kc1 	 H and, because of Kc1jH 0  H _ Kc1jH0, from
Proposition 22 it follows ;jK1  Kc1jK1  H jK1 and by means of condition 3 of Deﬁnition
21 one has H jK1  H _ Kc1jH0  H jH 0. Then, HjK1  HjH0 for any H such that
Hc 2 B1nH1 and f(HjK1) is the unique solution of the equation N0 Kc1
  ¼ max
x;N0 Kc1
  
.
On the other hand, if H is such that Hc 2 H1 (i.e. H jH 0  Kc1jH0) one has that the
N0ðH _ Kc1Þ ¼ max x;N 0 Kc1
  
has not unique solution (being N 0 Kc1
  ¼ N0 H _ Kc1 ).
Hence, deﬁne
N 1ðHÞ ¼
N 0ðHÞ if Kc1jH 0  H jH 0
r
l if H jH 0  Kc1jH 0 and AjK1 2 Er
0 otherwise
8>><>:
The function N1 on B is a necessity, moreover f(AjH) = N1(A _ Hc) for any H such that
HjK1  ;jK1.
In the same way we build B2,H2 and N2 and so on till B
k contains only the impossible
event.
The class of necessities {N1, . . . ,Nk} is a nested class and it is agreeing with the function
f, so f is a conditional necessity. h
4. ExamplesExample 25. Consider an area A, which is not an earthquake zone, and let H = ‘‘there
is an earthquake in A during this year’’, E = ‘‘in the area A there is no earthquake
victim’’, F = ‘‘in the area A the earthquake victims are more than 10% of population’’.
We can consider the following relation: H  ;; EjH  F jH the ﬁrst relation implies that
we believe very little in the possibility that an earthquake will be in the zone A, in
fact we judge the event H indifferent to the impossible event. While the second relation
implies that if we suppose that an earthquake will be in the zone A then we believe
more on the fact that the earthquake victims are more than 10% than there is no
earthquake victim, in fact a non-earthquake zone is usually not equipped to face an
earthquake.
The above relation is a coherent comparative conditional possibility and a conditional
possibility representing  is, for example, PðEc ^ F c j HÞ ¼ 1; PðE ^ HÞ ¼ PðF ^ HÞ ¼
PðHÞ ¼ 0; PðEjHÞ ¼ 15 ;PðF jHÞ ¼ 35.
Note that the given relation cannot be represented by a conditional possibility in the
sense of [21]. In fact, being P(E ^ H) = P(F ^ H) = P(H), both the conditional
possibilities on EjH and FjH must be, according to their deﬁnition, equal to 1, so the
only agreeing relation  is EjH  FjH.
Our characterization is more general than that representable by conditional possibilities
in the sense of [21]. To obtain a characterization for the relations representable by condi-
tional possibilities (in the sense of [21]) it is necessary to reinforce condition 3 of Deﬁnition
15 by requiring the following condition:
(sc) for every A,B 2 B and H,B ^ H 2 H,
A ^ BjH  AjB ^ H
and moreover if A ^ B ^ H5 ; and A ^ BjH  BjH, then AjB ^ H  HjH.
Thus, from the proof of Theorem 18 it follows that any relation on B · H satisfying
conditions (1,2,4) of Deﬁnition 15 and (sc) is representable by a conditional possibility
which satisﬁes condition (3).
Example 26. Let {A,B,C} be a partition of X and consider the following relation
;  A  C  A _ C  AjA _ C  B  A _ B  B _ C  X:
This relation is a coherent comparative conditional necessity: in fact it can be represented,
for example, by the following conditional necessity:
NðAÞ ¼ NðCÞ ¼ NðA _ CÞ ¼ 0; NðBÞ ¼ NðA _ BÞ ¼ 0:6; NðB _ CÞ ¼ 0:8
NðAjA _ CÞ ¼ 0:4; NðCjA _ CÞ ¼ 0:8
Consequences similar to that given in the previous example arise: this conditional necessity
representing  has as dual function (obviously a conditional possibility in the sense of
Deﬁnition 15) but does not satisfy condition (3).
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We study comparative models having as numerical reference framework conditional
possibilities and conditional necessities. In particular we give the necessary conditions
for representing a relation on a family of conditional events by a T-conditional possibility
(for a given triangular norm T), and we characterize completely those relations agreeing
with a conditional possibility (i.e. T = min).
A comparison with qualitative models arising from classic possibility theory is given.
Moreover, we provide the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the relations on a
ﬁnite set of conditional events representable by a coherent conditional necessity.
Appendix
In this section we characterize numerical conditional necessities by means of a suitable
nested class of necessities.
Theorem 27. Let N = {N0, . . . ,Nk} be a nested class of necessities on B0. Let
g : B0  B00 ! ½0; 1 be a function such that g(E,H) is a solution of all the equations
N aðE _ HcÞ ¼ maxfx;N aðHcÞg ð16Þ
with a = 0, . . . , jH and jH = min{j : H
c 2 Cj1 and Nj(Hc) = 0}. Moreover, g(E,H) is the
unique solution of Eq. (16) related to NjH . Then, g is a conditional necessity on B0  B00.Proof. Since g(E,H) is a solution of all the equations of the form (16) and it is the unique
solution of that related to NjH (since NjH ðHcÞ ¼ 0), then from condition 2 of Deﬁnition 7 it
follows, for j < jH, that
gðE;HÞ ¼ NjH ðE _ HcÞ 6 NjðE _ HcÞ
Obviously, for any E,H 2 B0, with H5 ;,
gðE ^ H ;HÞ ¼ NjH ððE ^ HÞ _ HcÞ ¼ NjH ðE _ HcÞ ¼ gðE;HÞ
so condition 1 of Deﬁnition 2 is satisﬁed.
To prove condition 2 it is suﬃcient to consider that NjH is a necessity on B0 and
gðH ;HÞ ¼ NjH ðH _ HcÞ ¼ 1, while gð;;HÞ ¼ gðHc;HÞ ¼ NjH ðHcÞ ¼ 0.
We prove now condition 3: for any triple A _ BjH,BjH, AjBc ^ H, one has
gðA _ B;HÞ ¼ NjH ðA _ B _ HcÞ; gðB;HÞ ¼ NjH ðB _ HcÞ;
gðA;Bc ^ HÞ ¼ NjðBc^HÞ ðA _ B _ HcÞ
and from Deﬁnition 7 it follows that
gðA;Bc ^ HÞ ¼ NjðBc^HÞ ðA _ B _ HcÞ 6 NjH ðA _ B _ HcÞ ¼ gðA _ B;HÞ
If NjH ðHcÞ ¼ NjH ðB _ HcÞ ¼ 0, then g(B,H) = 0 and
gðA _ B;HÞ ¼ NjH ðA _ B _ HcÞ ¼ gðA;Bc ^ HÞ
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– if NjH ðB _ HcÞ < NjH ðA _ B _ HcÞ, then (from condition 1 of Deﬁnition 7)
gðA;Bc ^ HÞ ¼ NjðBc^HÞ ðA _ B _ HcÞ ¼ NjH ðA _ B _ HcÞ ¼ gðA _ B;HÞ
and gðB;HÞ ¼ NjH ðB _ HcÞ < NjH ðA _ B _ HcÞ ¼ gðA;Bc ^ HÞ;
– if NjH ðB _ HcÞ ¼ NjH ðA _ B _ HcÞ > 0, then
gðA _ B;HÞ ¼ NjH ðA _ B _ HcÞ ¼ NjH ðB _ HcÞ ¼ gðB;HÞ
gðA;Bc ^ HÞ ¼ NjðBc^HÞ ðA _ B _ HcÞ 6 NjH ðA _ B _ HcÞ ¼ gðA _ B;HÞ
Hence, also condition 3 of Deﬁnition 2 holds. hTheorem 28. Let N be a conditional necessity on B0  B00. Consider the class of necessities
N = {N0, . . . ,Nk} defined on B0 as follows:
– N0(B) = N(BjX) for every B 2 B0;
– for any j = 1, . . . , k, let Bj = {B 2 Bj1 : Nj1(B) > 0} and Kj ¼
W
fB2BjgB
c
NjðBÞ ¼ NðBjKjÞ
Then the class N is a nested class.Proof. From condition 2 of Deﬁnition 2 it follows that the function N0 on B0 is a neces-
sity. Moreover, from the same condition one has that Nj (with j = 1, . . . ,k) is a necessity on
B0 since Njð;Þ ¼ Nj Kcj
 	
¼ N Kcj jKj
 	
¼ 0 and NjðXÞ ¼ Nj Kj _ Kcj
 	
¼ NðKjjKjÞ ¼ 1.
Then, being N 0ðA _ Kc1Þ ¼ max NðAjK1Þ;N0 Kc1
  
, N1 Kc1
  ¼ 0 implies
N 1ðA _ Kc1Þ ¼ max NðAjK1Þ;N 1 Kc1
   ¼ NðAjK1Þ 6 N 0ðA _ Kc1Þ
so N 0ðA _ Kc1ÞP NðAjK1Þ holds and condition 2 of Deﬁnition 7 is satisﬁed.
If H 2 B1nH1, then there exists an event D 2 B1 such that N0(H) > N0(D) > 0.
Consider Kc1 (that is
V
B2B1B), which is contained in any event B 2 B1, so in particular
Kc1 	 H and NðH jXÞ ¼ N 0ðHÞ > N0 Kc1
  ¼ N Kc1jX , moreover (being Kc1 	 H and from
the above considerations)
N 0ðHÞ ¼ NðH jXÞ ¼ NðH _ Kc1jXÞ ¼ max NðH jK1Þ;N Kc1jX
  
¼ max NðH jK1Þ;N 0 Kc1
   ¼ NðH jK1Þ ¼ N 1ðHÞ
Hence, for every H 2 B1nH1 one has N0(H) = N1(H).
Analogously those conditions hold for Nj with j > 1.
By construction there is j 2 {0, . . . ,k} such that Bj = Hj (i.e. Nj1ðBÞ ¼ Nj1 Kcj
 	
for
any B 2 Bj), so if Nj(B) = N(BjKj) = 0 for any B5 Kj with B 2 Bj, then j = k; otherwise
(i.e. at least an event B 	 Kj is such that N(BjKj) > 0), the procedure continues till Kk is
such that all B 	 Kk 2 Bk are such that N(CjKk) = 0.
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B00 the function NðjÞ is a solution of any equation Na(A ^ Bc) = max{x,Na(Bc)} such
that B 2 Ba, so the above class is agreeing with N(ÆjÆ). hRemark 29. Any given conditional necessity on B0  B00 generates a unique agreeing class
on B0, and vice versa a nested class gives rise to a unique conditional necessity on B0  B00.
Then, any conditional necessity on B0  B00 can be ‘‘represented’’ by means of a suitable
class of necessities instead of just a necessity measure.
When the conditional necessity N(ÆjÆ) is deﬁned on B0 · H withH 	 B00, then there exists
more than just one nested class agreeing with N(ÆjÆ):
Theorem 30. Let N be a conditional necessity on B0 · H with B0 a finite Boolean algebra and
H an additive set such that H 	 B00. Then, there exists (at least) a class N = {N0, . . . ,Nk} of
necessities on B0 agreeing with the conditional necessity N.Proof. Consider K0 =¤H2HH 2 H (being H an additive class) and deﬁne
N0(B) = N(BjK0), for every B 2 B0; then N0(Æ) deﬁned on B0 and it is a necessity.
Now consider B1 = {B 2 B0 : N0(B) > 0}, if B1 is not empty (otherwise N0 is agreeing
with N), let K1 ¼
W
B2B1B
c.
Then, if K1 2 H, then deﬁne N1(B) = N(BjK1) for every B 2 B0, so N1(Æ) is a necessity on
B0.
On the other hand (if K1 62 H) consider D1 = {H 2 H : Hc 2 B1}. If D1 is empty, it
means that all H 2 H are such that N0(Hc) = 0 and {N0} is an agreeing class. Otherwise (if
D1 is not empty) let K1 ¼
W
H2D1H , by deﬁnition of D1 one has that K1 2 H and
Kc1 ¼
V
H2D1H
c 2 B1, so K1 2 D1. Hence, deﬁne N1(B) = N(BjK1), which implies that N1 is
a necessity.
Then consider B2 = {B 2 B1 : N1(B) > 0}, if B2 is empty then for any B 2 B0 there exists
j 2 {0,1} such that Nj(Bc) = 0 and so the class {N0,N1} is nested and moreover it is
agreeing with N. If B2 is not empty continue as above till the set Bk is empty. h
The above result implies that any conditional necessity N on B0 · H can be ‘‘repre-
sented’’ by means of a suitable class of necessities, and when H 	 B00 there are many clas-
ses of necessities agreeing with N: in fact, the one built in the proof of Theorem 30 is just
an example.
Proposition 31. Let N be a conditional necessity on B · H with B a Boolean algebra and H
an additive set such that H 	 B0. Then there exists a conditional necessity N 0 defined on
B · B0 extending P.Proof. Theorem 30 assures that a conditional necessity on B · H generates at least an
agreeing class of necessities on B. On the other hand, any nested class generates a unique
conditional necessity deﬁned on B · B0 as proved in Theorem 27. Therefore, N can be
extended as conditional necessity on B · B0 and each extension N 0 corresponds to an
agreeing class. h
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Proof. ðaÞ () ðbÞ: if N is a coherent conditional necessity on F, then there is a
conditional necessity bN on B · B0 such that its restriction on F coincides with N, so (by
Theorem 28) bN gives rise to a unique agreeing class N, which is compatible with N and so
N(EijHi) is a solution of all Eq. (7) for all b such that Nb Hci
 
> 0 and it is the unique
solution for b = j*.
Conversely, the agreeing class N of necessities on B of condition (b) generates a unique
conditional necessity bN on B · B0 (see Theorem 27), and bN jF ¼ N .
ðaÞ () ðcÞ: N is a coherent conditional necessity iff there exists a conditional necessitybN on B · B0 such that its restriction on F coincides with N. Then, by putting, for any
EjH 2 F, N(EjH) = 1  P(EcjH), one has that P is a coherent conditional possibility (in
fact bN gives rise to a conditional possibility on B · B0, and its restriction to F coincides
with P) and from Theorem 5 since condition (a) is equivalent to (c) there exists a sequence
of compatible systems
Sa ¼
max
CrEci ^Hi
xar ¼ min PðEci jHiÞ;maxCrHi x
a
r
 
if max
CrHi
xa1r < 1
xar P x
a1
r if Cr 2 Ha
xar ¼ xa1r if Cr 2 Ca nHa
max
Cr2C0
xr ¼ 1
xar P 0 8Cr 2 C0
8>>>>><>>>>>:
note that Sa is equivalent to
1 max
CrEci ^Hi
xar ¼ max NðEijHiÞ; 1 maxCrHi x
a
r
 
if max
CrHi
xa1r < 1
xar P x
a1
r if Cr 2 Ha
xar ¼ xa1r if Cr 2 Ca nHa
max
Cr2C0
xr ¼ 1
xar P 0 8Cr 2 C0
8>>>>>><>>>>>:
Note that the ﬁrst equations of system Sa are equivalent to Eq. (7) for a such that
Pa1(Hi) < 1 or equivalently N a1 Hci
 
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